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Since the mid 90‟s, the concepts of ecosystem and environmental services  have enjoyed a 10 
growing popularity at  academic and operational levels. According to the authors of the 11 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA, 2005), ecosystem services are the benefits provided 12 
by ecosystems tohumans. They are divided into four categories: provisioning services 13 
(e.g.food, water), regulating services (e.g.regulation of floods, droughts, soils degradation, 14 
diseases), supporting services (e.gsoils formation, biogeochemical cycles) and cultural and 15 
amenity services. Environmental services are only one part of ecosystem services: they 16 
correspond to the benefits generated by humans  with the support of ecosystems (Lugo, 2008). 17 
They are often considered as public goods and positive externalities by the economic theory, 18 
not being adequately valued and thus underproduced (Cornes and Sandler, 1996). 19 
 20 
Several researchers consider either the monetary valuation of environmental services 21 
(Costanza and al. 1997; Pagiola and al. 2004; Chevassus-Au-Louis and al. 2009), or the tools 22 
allowing to internalize positive externalities induced by these services. To promote the 23 
provision of these services, several schemes are possible (e.g regulation, taxes, voluntary 24 
approaches), one of those being the remuneration of some actions (or renunciation to others 25 
                                                          
1
 PhD student in economics, CEMOTEV (Centre for the Study on Globalisation, Conflicts, Territories and 
Vulnerabilities) EA 4457, University of Versailles Saint Quentin-en-Yvelines, France ; mail: 
thomas.legrand@greensynergie.com  
2
 Associate professor in economics, CEMOTEV (Centre for the Study on Globalisation, Conflicts, Territories 
and Vulnerabilities) EA 4457, University of Versailles Saint Quentin-en-Yvelines, France ; mail: 
geraldine.froger@uvsq.fr  
3
 Visiting profesor in CINPE (International Center for Sustainable Development Economic Policy), Costa Rica, 
from the CIRAD (International Center of Cooperation in Agronomical Research for Development)  – Arena, 
France ; mail: jflecoq@cirad.fr 
4
 This comunication has been redacted in the framework of the SERENA (Environmental Services and rural 
space uses) project funded by the French National Agency of Research (ANR-08-STRA-13) [2009-2012]. 
http://www.serena-anr.org/  
12
th
 BIOECON Conference, “From the Wealth of Nations to the Wealth of Nature: Rethinking Economic 
Growth”, Venice, September 27th-28th, 2010 
 2 
actions) for maintaining, restoring or improving of a clearly defined service, this scheme 26 
refers to “Payment for Environmental Services” (PES). PES have been especially used to 27 
promote (or restrict) forestal uses and it relates mostly to 4 types of environmental services: 28 
carbon maintaining or sequestration, biodiversity protection, water resources protection and 29 
landscape beauty (Example: ecotouristic activities) (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002 ; Wunder, 30 
2005). Wunder (2005, 2006, 2007) defines PES as: « a voluntary transaction where a well-31 
defined ES (or a land-use likely to secure that service) is being ‘bought’ by a (minimum one) 32 
ES buyer from a (minimum one) ES provider if and only if the ES provider secures ES 33 
provision during a determined time (conditionality) ». 34 
 35 
PES have being largely experimented in developed countries (Europe, USA, Australia), this 36 
tool appears less widespread in developing countries where significant obstacles seem to slow 37 
down its implementation (lack of willingness to pay among the beneficiaries, environmental 38 
services poorly defined, difficulties to contract, poorly defined property rights among others) 39 
Some Latin American countries, such as Costa Rica or Mexico, are often quoted as precursors 40 
in the world implementing PES. Our contribution will focus on the case of Costa Rica to shed 41 
light on the debates over the assessment of PES. In Costa Rica, the PES program (PESP ; 42 
« Programa de Pago por Servicios Ambientales » – PPSA), was instituted in 1996 by the forest 43 
law 7575, is part of a 20 years-long process of forest policy evolution and appears undeniably 44 
as a precursor and a model in the developing world (Pagiola, Bishop and Landell-Mills, 2002 ; 45 
Sembrès, 2007). The National Forestry Financing Fund (FONAFIFO
5
), trust fund in charge of 46 
the PESP management, buys to land owners, usually individuals, the environmental services 47 
generated by some defined land uses, mainly forest ones (cf Box 1).  Four environmental 48 
services are explicitly recognized by the 7575 forest law: mitigation of greenhouse gases 49 
emissions, water protection, biodiversity protection, and scenic beauty. This program is unique 50 
in terms of the population concerned, its capacity to generate payments from a quite large 51 
diversity of actors
6
 and the size of the contracted areas in proportion to the size of the country. 52 
                                                          
5
 Instituted in 1996 by article 46 of the 7575 forest law, the FONAFIFO, trust fund endowed with an 
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resources for the payment of environmental services and manages thus program. Since  2003, FONAFIFO 
activity is supported, in addition to its central office, by 7 regional offices (9 currently) located in the  SINAC 
(National System of Conservation Areas) offices, in charge of the selection and contracting process , that used to 
be SINAC responsibility from  1997 to 2002.   
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From 1997 to 2008, 8 345 contracts of PES have covered 670 000 ha of forest, that is to say 53 
some 13% of the national territory. 54 
 55 
 56 
 57 
 58 
 59 
 60 
 61 
 62 
 63 
 64 
 65 
 66 
 67 
 68 
 69 
 70 
 71 
 72 
 73 
Generally speaking, PES mechanisms are an issue of fierce debate concerning their 74 
implementation in developing countries. Some authors present PES as the tool with the highest 75 
potential to curb environmental resources degradation, the fittest tool to overcome 76 
imperfections and limited successes of Integrated Conservation and Development Projects 77 
(ICDP) and sustainable resources management projects (Ferraro and Kiss, 2002 ; Pagiola and 78 
al., 2002 ; Niesten and Rice, 2004 ; Wunder, 2005). Others authors are more sceptical on its 79 
effectiveness (capacity to reach the defined environmental objectives), its efficiency (relation 80 
between effectiveness reached and the economic investment required), its fairness, its 81 
legitimacy and its sustainability (Bulkan, 2004; Karsenty and Nasi, 2004; Romero and 82 
Andrade, 2004; Engel and al. 2008, Wunder and al. 2008). They have reservations about the 83 
expected outcomes of PES underlining the difficulties of implementation (Examples: imperfect 84 
ecological and economics knowledge, high level of transaction costs, inadequate methodology 85 
for the monitoring of the state of environmental services) or identify negative  effects of this 86 
Box 1 PESP modalities 
 In 1997, at the launching of the program, three types of land uses could generate payments:   
 New plantation (PESP-Reforestation), 
 Forest management (PESP-Forest management), 
 Forest protection (PESP-Protection). 
In 2009, PESP have 4 main modalities, some of them presenting some variants: 
 New plantation (PESP-Reforestation), 
 « Tree plantation  in agroforestry systems » (PPSE-Agroforestry systems) instituted in 2003, 
differing from PESP-Reforestation because it pays for tree plantations in an agroforestry area 
such as a coffee plantation  
   « Natural regeneration » (PESP-Natural regeneration), instituted in 2006, differing from PESP-
Reforestation because it pays for a natural process by which the forest regenerate itself and not a 
plantation by man. Three variants of this modality are distinguished :  
o  « Natural regeneration with productive potential », in which trees can be farmed.  
o « Natural regeneration in pastures», in which forest farming is not foreseen.   
 « Natural regeneration in Kyoto or carbon land », defined as the lands allowing FONAFIFO to 
trade carbon sequestration services.  
 Forest protection (PPSE-Protection), for which 4 variants can be distinguished since 2009 :  
o « Protection in wildlife protected areas » targets the lands located inside the wildlife 
protected areas. 
o  « Protection in the conservation blanks » targets important lands for conservation  not 
yet covered by the protected areas system.  
o « Protection of hydrological resources » targets important lands for water resources 
protection. 
o  « Protection of forest » targets others lands. 
The « forest management » modality has been removed from the PESP in 2002 while the modality of « 
existing plantation » (PESP-Existing plantation) created in 1998 has functioned only in 1998, 1999 and 
2003.  It allowed already existing plantation to benefit from PESP, differing from PESP-Reforestation that 
could only benefit to new plantations. 
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mechanism (commodification of environmental services, appropriation of the instrument by 87 
actors not initially targeted, strategy for funds capturing, weakening of public authorities and of 88 
the role of environmental public policies, ecological systems degradation, hindrance to the 89 
development of new and more sustainable practices, worsening of inequalities. 90 
 91 
The aim of our contribution is to assess the efficiency of the Costa Rican PESP, as a 92 
conservation tool
7
, while discussing some proposed trails to improve this PES program. Our 93 
study is mostly focused on the forest protection modality, by far the most important of the 94 
PESP
8
. It is based on a review of the literature (scientific articles and original reports) and on 95 
some interviews of different actors involved in the design, implementation and evolution of the 96 
program such as: civil servants, researchers, representatives of the private sector, of forestry 97 
organizations, conducted in 2009 and 2010.  98 
 99 
1. The environmental effectiveness of the Costa Rican PESP under discussion  100 
 101 
We will analyze the effectiveness of Costa Rican PESP in three stages: we will first study to 102 
what extent the PESP has really contributed to the extension of forest cover, the following 103 
step will be to analyze if the PESP has generated the expected environmental services, to 104 
finally conclude with the evaluation of the sustainability of PESP environmental outcomes.   105 
 106 
1. The impact on forest cover 107 
 108 
About 670 000 hectares of forest have been under contract on the framework of the PESP 109 
since 1997, that is to say 13% of the national territory while the forest cover which 110 
                                                          
7
 In the framework of this PES program, objectives are not exclusively environmental (extension of forest cover, 
environmental services generation) but include, since 2002, the fight against poverty (cf. the statement of Carlos 
Manuel Rodriguez, the ministry of environment leading this transformation, quoted in Hartshorn and al. (2005): 
“…we need to stop viewing the PSA program as merely a tool for preserving biodiversity and promoting the 
planting of forests. Instead, we need to see it as a tool for rural development that also includes reforestation and 
biodiversity conservation.”). It is noticeable that one of the implicit objectives is to support the adoption of 
practices ecologically more sustainable for the forest sector.  Although there is no a priori reasons why the 
environmental objective should prevail over the fight against poverty in the case of PES (Muradian and al. 2009; 
Pascual and al. 2009), we have chosen here to focus on the assessment of the program as a conservation tool. 
8
 This modality concentrates most of the forest area contracted in the framework of the PESP: about  90% of the 
forest area under contract in the frameworkof the PESP between 1997 and 2008 (without considering the 
modality of tree plantation in agroforestry systems for which the scope is being measured in terms of number of 
trees and not in terms of hectares). 
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represented 42% of the territory in 1997, has reached 48%
9
 in 2005 (Calvo-Alvarado and 111 
Sánchez-Azofeifa, 2007). The importance of the scale of the PESP and the success of the 112 
country in reversing the deforestation trend make it tempting to establish a causal link 113 
between the PESP and the reduction of deforestation. However, the outcomes obtained in 114 
terms of environmental effectiveness are to be placed in perspective for several reasons.  115 
 116 
First, Pagiola (2008) notices that it is difficult to isolate the effects of PESP of those induced 117 
by others environmental policies and of the economic context. Indeed, the PESP has been 118 
instituted at the same time of the prohibition of deforestation
10
, for which it represents in 119 
some ways compensation. As this measure has allowed reducing deforestation and as it has 120 
been made acceptable and thus possible by the PESP, this program can claim to have 121 
contributed indirectly to reduce deforestation (Pfaff and al. 2006).  Nevertheless, the protected 122 
areas system (Sanchez-Azofeifa, 2007), the fall of the profitability of livestock farming 123 
reducing the incentive to convert forests in pastures, in particular in isolated areas (White and 124 
al. 2001, Arroyo-Mora and al. 2005 quoted by Pagiola 2008), the development of ecotourism 125 
(Rojas and Aylward, 2003) and the increase in emigration (Kull and al. 2007) have also 126 
contributed to reduce deforestation. Furthermore, the trend of increasing forest cover dates 127 
from the early 1990s that is to say before the launching of the PESP (Wunder, 2007). 128 
 129 
Moreover, several studies show that many beneficiaries of the PESP say that they would have 130 
protected the forest if the PESP-Protection did not exist (Miranda and al 2003; Ortiz and al. 131 
2003). Ortiz and al. (2003) argue that « the real effectiveness in its modality of « forest 132 
 protection » has a value ranging from 22% to 27%, numbers that respectively represent the 133 
percentage of the land owners that would dedicate their farms to agriculture and livestock 134 
farming in case the PESP does not exist and the proportion of PESP beneficiaries who would 135 
not be willing to dedicate themselves to conservation in case the PESP would be 136 
suspended
11
. » The authors indicate that 67% of the sample of participants to the PESP-137 
Protection would be willing to preserve the forest without receiving PES, that 55 % would 138 
                                                          
9
 Forest coverture in 2005 was evaluated to 48% not including mangrove swamp, moorand forestry plantation; 
Fonafifo estimates that the total forest area represented 51 % of the national territory in 2005 (Sanchez, interview 
2010). 
10
 The law 7575 says in its article 19 that « On the lands covered with forest, changing land uses will not be 
allowed » (« En terrenos cubiertos de bosque, no se permitirá cambiar el uso del suelo »). 
11
 “La efectividad real del PSA-Protección tiene un valor entre un 22% y 27%, valores que corresponden, 
respectivamente, al porcentaje de propietarios que dedicarían sus fincas a agricultura y ganadería en caso de 
que no existiera el PSA-Protección, y el de los que no están dispuestos a dedicarse a la conservación si el PSA 
se suspendiera » 
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maintain the forest cover of their lands in case the PESP does not exist (45% for conservation, 139 
8% for forest farming and 2% for ecotourism) and that 43% were already protecting the forest 140 
before receiving PES. These answers, questioning the additionality
12
 of the program, are 141 
however to be put in perspective to the extent that deforestation being forbidden, interviewees 142 
may not have wanted to divulge their interest in engaging in this illegal activity (Hartshorn 143 
and al. 2005). According to Pagiola (2008), the fact that the PESP has a long awaiting list of 144 
people wishing to participate in the program suggests that deforestation is not very profitable 145 
in many areas. In fact, participation to the PESP is voluntary, and the land owners choose to 146 
participate or not to the program, which can lead to integrate lands whose conservation 147 
implies the lowest opportunity costs and whose deforestation risks are the lowest, 148 
characterizing a problem of anti-selection (Sanchez-Azofeifa and al. 2007). Several studies 149 
(Hartshorn and al. 2005, Ortiz and al. 2003, Zbinden and Lee 2005) underline the poverty of 150 
the soils of the lands under PES-Protection contracts: as about three quarters of the soils
13
 of 151 
these lands don‟t allow an agricultural use, these lands would probably have not been 152 
converted to non forest uses (pastures, agriculture or others) if the PESP did not exist
14
.   153 
 154 
Thirdly, formal tests to assess the impact of the PES-Protection on forest cover give mixed 155 
results. Robalino and al. (2008) consider that between 2000 and 2005, the PESP has allowed 156 
to reduce deforestation in 0,4 % of the area contracted each year, a rate slightly higher than 157 
the national average rate of deforestation (0,3%) but still low. This result is higher than what 158 
Pfaff and al. (2007) have found for the 1997 to 2000 period: lands under PESP contract were 159 
then less threatened by deforestation (0,2%) and the PESP have thus allowed to avoid 160 
deforestation for less than 0,2% of the lands under contract each year. Robalino and al. (2008) 161 
attribute this slight improvement at a better targeting
15
 of the program and at an increase of 162 
                                                          
12
 For a PES scheme, additionality consists in paying for the adoption of practices that would not have been 
adopted in the absence of payment (Engel and al, 2008). 
13
 According to Hartshorn and al. (2005), 51% of the contracts under PES-Protection are on lands allowing only 
forest management and forest protection and in addition 20% are on lands with « strong limitations for 
agriculture ». According to Ortiz and al. (2003) 28, 2% of the total of lands under contrat of PES-Protection 
don‟t allow any productive activity, while 48,6% of the lands under contract of  PES-Protection could be used 
for forest farming and 23,2% for agricultural activities. 
14
 In a sample of 100 bénéficiaries of the PESP-Protection interviewed by Ortiz and al. (2003), 36 have indicated 
that the forest under PES-Protection contract has been used before for pastures, a number superior to the 
percentage of lands fit for agriculture (23, 2%), which leads to think that déforestation can hit lands unfit for 
agriculture and that it can be avoided by the PESP.  
15
 While the Costa Rican PESP dit not initially prioritize applications to the program, some criterias have been 
defined since 1999 in order to target the most important lands for ES provision and also since 2004 from the 
point of view of the fight against poverty. Priority areas for the protection modality, that concentrates the bulk of 
the contracted areas, correspond today (FONAFIFO processes manual, 2009) to: the « conservation blanks » 
(« vacios de conservacion » that correspond to the strategic areas for conservation not yet integrated in the 
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the risk of deforestation at the national level. Tattenbach and al. (2006) have developed an 163 
econometric model of gross deforestation for the 1996-2000 period in the Central Volcanic 164 
Cordillera Conservation Area. Allowing them to estimate the area under PES-Protection for 165 
which deforestation have been avoided to be 38%
16
 of the area under PES contract. In their 166 
survey of the Osa region, Sierra and Russman (2006) conclude that the PESP has not allowed 167 
to reduce deforestation between 1997 and 2003 but that it has contributed to the increase of 168 
forest cover by making it easier to abandon agriculture, thus allowing the natural regeneration 169 
of forests through the conversion in “bush” of the lands. 170 
 171 
It is worth reminding that additionality has never been mentioned as an objective of the 172 
program (Pagiola, 2008). The PESP does not target participants on the basis of the 173 
deforestation risk but rather on the basis of the areas‟ potential in terms of environmental 174 
services generation and fight against poverty. On the contrary, its philosophy is to «to 175 
‘recognize’ the environmental services of whoever is providing them » and « If their budget 176 
was sufficient they would pay every forest owner, as all forests are thought to provide 177 
environmental services
17
 » (Pagiola, 2008). Assessing the Ecomarkets project
18
, Hartshorn 178 
and al. (2005) state that paying for the protection of forests that do not require protection 179 
measures, insofar as they would not have been deforested anyway, is an inefficient use of the 180 
of the scarce funds for conservation and recommend to focus the investments on the lands 181 
where they can be useful to change behaviours. The World Bank puts the emphasis in 182 
particular on the additionality criterion, especially with a view toward being able to access 183 
funding under the REDD
19
 framework (Robalino 2009, interview).  It is backed in this way by 184 
forestry organizations such as the ONF
20
, Codeforsa
21
, Fundecor
22
. These organizations wish 185 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
existing system of protected areas), the lands in wildlife protected areas, the lands in biological corridors, the 
indigenous territories, the distric with a low index of social development. 
16
 13% in the areas where the deforestation risk is low and 47% where it is high.   
17
 “If their budget was sufficient they would pay every forest owner, as all forests are thought to provide 
environmental services” 
18
 The Ecomarkets (« Ecomercados » in spanish) project has been funded by the Global Environmental Fund, the 
World Bank ad the Government of Costa Rica for the 2001-2005 period. This project of  62 millions USD aimed 
to strengthen and expand the PESP (Hartshorn and al. 2005). 
19
 The Reduction of the greenhouse gas Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation is an initiative 
aimaing at offering financial incentives to developing countries to avoid deforestation and forest degradation. 
The 15th
 
Conference Of Parties at the United Nations Framewok Convention on Climate Change that took place 
at the end of 2009 at Copenhaguen confirmed the need to include this approach in the fight against climate 
change. UN-REDD state that the financial flows in the REDD framework could reach 30 billons USD per year, 
thus becoming a major channel for rural development in developing countries.  
20
 The national Forest Office instituted by the law 7575 represents the whole forestry sector. 
21
 The Commission of Forest Development of San Carlos is a NGO created in 1983 which is today active in the 
northern area of the country (http://www.codeforsa.org). 
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the areas of the agricultural frontier most threatened by deforestation were included in the 186 
PESP-Protection priority areas, for which the program could mobilize funds on the carbon 187 
international market in the REDD framework (Mendez 2009, interview).  188 
 189 
2. The impacts on the generation of environmental services 190 
 191 
We will assess on the one hand to what extent the PESP beneficiaries have really 192 
implemented the agreed (forest) land uses, and, on the other hand, if these land uses do 193 
generate the expected ES.  194 
 195 
On the first issue, Pagiola (2008) says that « the PSA program has established a strong system 196 
to monitor land user compliance with payment contracts». This monitoring is made easier by 197 
the uploading on the GPS of the maps of the farms under contract, and is carried out through 198 
field visits, forest covers studies through Landsat 7 (since the mid 2000s) and aerial 199 
photographies (Arce and Navarrete, 2009, interview). However, in the first years of the 200 
program, deficiencies in the compliance to the forest management contracts and their control 201 
by forest regents in situation of conflict of interests
23
, especially in the Osa region, have been 202 
denounced and have contributed to the exclusion of the forest management modality.  203 
 204 
According to Pagiola (2008), « It is unfortunately impossible to determine the extent to which 205 
the PSA program has successfully generated environmental services. Although the PSA 206 
program has established a strong system to monitor land user compliance with payment 207 
contracts, the program, the program remains weak in monitoring its effectiveness in 208 
generating the desired services ». However, while the ES generated by the program have not 209 
been measured directly, their generation can be estimated indirectly through the study of the 210 
characteristics of the PESP areas of intervention.  211 
 212 
Before analyzing in more details the generation of environmental services according to each 213 
type of service, we can notice that the capacity of some land uses promoted by the PESP to 214 
generate the expected environmental services has been contested. Some ecological 215 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
22
  The Foundation for the Development of the Central Volcanic Cordillera is an NGO founded in 1989 which 
has played a key role in the PESP design. http://www.fundecor.org  
23
 In the framework of the PESP, the forest regents are in charge of designing the management plans of the areas 
under contrat and to monitor their implementation. They often find themselves in a situation of conflict of 
interests as they are paid and recruited by the land owners they are supposed to control.  
12
th
 BIOECON Conference, “From the Wealth of Nations to the Wealth of Nature: Rethinking Economic 
Growth”, Venice, September 27th-28th, 2010 
 9 
organizations have considered that the forest management modality has not generated the 216 
expected environmental services, biodiversity conservation in particular, which contributed to 217 
the exclusion of this modality in 2002. They have denounced the degradation of forest that 218 
resulted – according to Baltodano (2009, interview) the « forest management » modality 219 
allowed to cut 28% of the forest - through the openings of paths, the falls of trees, the 220 
selection of trees in capacity to reproduce themselves and having the best reproduction 221 
characteristics. On the contrary, according to Navarro (2009, interview), the CATIE chair of 222 
forest ecology has demonstrated that forest management, as it is promoted in the PESP
24
, 223 
generates comparable results in terms of biodiversity (structure and composition) as the ones 224 
generated by a forest under conservation. Furthermore, some ecological organizations 225 
(Baltodano 2009, interview; Figuerola 2009, interview; Jimenez 2009, interview) have 226 
underlined that the forest plantations (« existing plantations » or « reforestation » modalities 227 
of the PESP) do not generate biodiversity conservation services (as they are often 228 
monocultures using introduced species) and hydrological services.  229 
 230 
The PESP impact in terms of hydrological services seems weak. Until now, the PESP has 231 
been largely
25
 focused on the areas where few hydrological services were likely to be 232 
generated and a relatively low number of important areas from a hydrological point of view 233 
has been incorporated to the PESP (Pagiola, 2008). In addition, the idea that forest land uses 234 
promoted by the PESP would improve the hydrological services is based upon a belief very 235 
rooted in Costa Rica and in the rest of Central America that the forest are always beneficial to 236 
hydrological services (Pagiola 2002, Kaymowitz 2000) while this link is in fact not well 237 
established scientifically
26
 (Pagiola 2008, Bishop and Landell-Mills 2002, Smith and al. 2008, 238 
Reis and al. 2007). Nevertheless, in Costa Rica, the main concern is about water quality for 239 
which the link with forest cover is better established (Pagiola, 2008). However, the 240 
monitoring of the impact of land uses promoted by the PESP on the hydrological services has 241 
not been carried out yet in Costa Rica (Pagiola 2008) but it will be in the future on pilot 242 
projects in the framework of the MMBIEM project
27
. Finally, two evolutions of the program 243 
                                                          
24
 The farming intensity was less than 10 m3, that is to say between 2 and 3 trees on  400 per hectare every 15 
years (Navarro, 2009 interview) 
25
 In  65% of the cases according to Tattenbach and al (2006) quoted by Pagiola(2008), using datas from Fallas 
(2006) 
26
 Especially regarding the link between forest cover and water volume or the availability of water during the dry 
season.  
27
 The « Mainstreaming Market Based Instruments for Environmental Management »  project (commonly called 
Ecomarkets II) is a 80 millions USD project from the Global Environmental Fund, the World Bank and the 
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should allow the improvement of hydrological services generation. The introduction of the 244 
water tariff as a mean of funding the PESP should improve the targeting of the important 245 
areas from a hydrological point of view as the decree establishing it mentions that the 246 
resources it generates should be spent at the level of the same watershed (Pagiola 2008). 247 
Moreover, the hydrological importance has been established as a targeting criterion since 248 
2009.   249 
 250 
The estimate of the PESP impact in terms of biodiversity conservation can be carried on by 251 
studying to what extent the lands enrolled in the PESP are located in priority areas for 252 
biodiversity conservation. These priority areas have been identified at the national level in 253 
1996 by the GRUAS study, a proposal of land uses planning for biodiversity conservation that 254 
served as a basis for the definition of PESP priority areas
28
. In 2003, a broader definition of 255 
these areas includes the priority biological corridors identified by the Ecomarkets project and 256 
the SINAC
29
. In 2005, some 30% or 59% of the active contracts correspond to priority areas 257 
for biodiversity conservation according to the narrow (of 1996) or broader (of 2003) GRUAS 258 
definition. The proportion of contracts corresponding to these priority areas, in its broader 259 
definition, has increased since 2003. Due to the efforts of  FONAFIFO  since it took on the 260 
responsibility of the application process instead of the SINAC
30
 (Pagiola 2008). Tattenbach 261 
and al. (2006) got a similar outcome:, 65% of the areas under PES contract zones in 2005 262 
correspond to priority areas for biodiversity conservation. Using their model of avoided 263 
deforestation, they thus estimate that the PESP has allowed to prevent the loss of 72 000 264 
hectares of forests in priority areas for biodiversity conservation between 1999 and 2005. 265 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Governement of Costa Rica supporting the development of  the PESP during the 2007-2012 period (World 
Bank, 2006) 
28
 The proposal aims to make sure that at least 90% of the country‟s biodiversity, using as an indicator the 
macrotypes of vegetation, will be conserved.  This conservation strategy propose to include 9 additional 
macrotypes of vegetation to the 22 already present in the protected area system through the expansion of this 
system and 8 others macrotypes through conservation at the private properties level. This study has been updated 
through a work launched in 2004 and which was still going on in 2009.  The GRUAS II project aims to identify 
not only the types of vegetation but also the fresh water and coastal-marine ecological systems and species that 
are not adequately represented in the current network of protected („the conservation blanks”). 
(http://www.gruas.go.cr/)  
29
 According to the biodiversity law (1998), the National System of Conservation Areas is an institutional system 
of decentralized and participative management that integrates the skills of the Ministry in charge of the 
environement (MINAE) in terms of forestry, wildlife and wildlife protected areas in order to dictate the policies, 
plan and implement processes aiming at the sustainability of natural resources management of Costa Rica. The 
SINAC is made of 11sub-systems called conservation areas and a central office. 
(http://www.sinac.go.cr/informacion.php) 
30
 The proportion of new PES contracts in the GRUAS areas and the priority biological corridors identified by 
the Ecomarkets  project and the SINAC has increased from 35,2% in 2002 to 66,7% in 2003 (this rate was lower 
than 48% between 1999 and 2002 and was higher than 60% between 2003 and 2005). 
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According to the assessment of the Ecomarkets project (Hartshorn and al. 2005), more than 266 
70% of resources (either in terms of area covered or in terms of numbers of contracts) of the 267 
PESP are allocated to priority corridors from the point of view of biodiversity conservation in 268 
2005, versus 58% during the 1999-2002 period considering the number of contracts. This can 269 
be explained by the fact that PESP areas of intervention are too scattered: in 2005, about 270 
70%
31
 of the country‟s territory is located in at least one of the different priority areas 271 
(GRUAS, SINAC, Mesoamerican Biological Corridors and cantons of low index of social 272 
development
32
). According to Arce and Navarrete (2009, interview) in the framework of the 273 
MMBIEM project, a monitoring of biodiversity is carried on since recently by the INBIO
33
 in 274 
some pilot areas of the program, without yet any available results.  275 
 276 
According to Pagiola (2008), The PESP has sequestered around 1 million tons of carbon 277 
between 1998 and 2005
34
 through the « new plantations » modality (PES-Reforestation) that 278 
has concerned 21 000 hectares. « As the bulk of area contracted was under the forest 279 
conservation contract, however, the extent of carbon sequestration services the PSA Program 280 
has generated is driven primarily by avoided deforestation, and so cannot be estimated 281 
without better estimates of actual land use impact »  (Pagiola, 2008). Indeed, we have seen 282 
that the estimates of the additionality of the PESP-Protection vary strongly depending on the 283 
authors. While the most optimistic think the PESP has allowed to avoid deforestation in 38% 284 
of the cases (Tattenbach and al. 2006), Most of the authors (Pfaff and al. (2007), Robalino and 285 
al. (2008), Sierra and Russman (2006)) consider its impact on deforestation to be very weak.  286 
According to the most optimistic estimate (Tattenbach and al. 2006
35
), the PESP has allowed 287 
to reduce of some 11 millions of tons of carbon between 1999 and 2005. 288 
 289 
                                                          
31
 About 60% in 2004 according to Engel and al. (2009) 
32
 This index is defined by the MIDEPLAN, ministry of national planing and economic policy, and aims at 
bringing the public policies around to the less developped areas of the country and at carrying on the monitoring 
of their social development. It measures at the countries‟ districts and cantons levels the social development from 
7 variables: school infrastructure, access to special educative programs, childhood mortality, the relation 
between the mortality of the children less than 5 years-old and the overall mortality, the size backwardness of the 
children in first grade (« primer grado »), the average residential electricity consumption, the births of children 
from a single mothers.  
33
 Founded in 1989, the National Institue of Biodiversity is a NGO dedicated mostly to the realization of the 
inventory and monitoring of the country‟s biodiversity as well as its conservation through the sharing of 
knowledge and its valorization through bio-prospection contracts. http://www.inbio.ac.cr/es/default.html  
34
 Considering the hypotesis of a sequestration rate of some 10 tons of carbon per hectare per year, until a 
maximum of some 100 tons of carbon per hectare (Catie, 1999).  
35
 Using their avoided deforestation model and an estimate of some 100 tons of carbon sequestered per hectare in 
existing forets (Pagiola and al, 2008) 
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Altogether, the PESP has weak effects on hydrological services generation, uncertain effects 290 
on the mitigation of greenhouse gases emissions and rather positive impacts on biodiversity 291 
conservation.  292 
 293 
3. The sustainability of the PESP environmental impacts  294 
 295 
From a contractual point of view and in the case of contracts for forest protection (PESP-296 
Protection), there is no expectative of sustainability apart from the renewing of the 297 
contracts
36
, which is what FONAFIFO tries to do to the extent of the available resources, 298 
except for the contracts concerning non priority areas (Pagiola, 2008). In the case of the 299 
plantation contracts (PESP-Reforestation), beneficiaries have the legal obligation to maintain 300 
the trees during 20 years, which is to say after the end of the payments. The difficulties met 301 
by the land owners between the end of the payments (after 5th year) and the wood farming 302 
(the twentieth year) have led to the increase of the amount of the payment for the PESP-303 
Reforestation from 600 to 816 USD between 2004 and 2005 and from 816 USD to 980 USD 304 
between 2008 and 2009.   305 
 306 
The most important factor of the sustainability of the program is its financing. From this point 307 
of view, the dependency of the PESP on the tax on fuel is worrying as pressures could be 308 
exercised to reduce it in the future, for example in the case of an important increase in energy 309 
price.  Individual contracts with water users are a source of sustainability of the program and 310 
their renewing is encouraging but they only represent a small part of the funding: 2,6% of the 311 
funds distributed between 1997 and 2009 (FONAFIFO). The same is true for the 312 
environmental services certificates, mechanism launched in 2001 aiming at raising funds from 313 
voluntary private companies from sectors such as transport, industry, as an expression of their 314 
corporate social responsibility in order to increase and diversify the funding sources of the 315 
program: it has allowed to ensure only 0,2 % of the total funding of the PESP between 1997 316 
and 2009 (FONAFIFO)
37
. The implementation of the water tariff is encouraging as it should 317 
generate, once it is completely implemented, 5 millions of USD per year (Pagiola, 2008). 318 
FONAFIFO hopes also that the carbon sales on the international market could generate some 319 
                                                          
36
 As we have already mentionned, deforestation is forbidden, which allows to some exten the sustainability of 
gorest protection.  
37
 Since its creation, 71 contracts of funding have been signed by private companies.  In order to better « sell » 
this funding  (market segmentation), several certificates exist today focusing on biodiversity and scenic beauty  
(« Forest alive » - « Bosque vivo »), on hydrological resources protection (“life water “ - « agua vida ») or on 
compensation of CO2 emissions of transports ( “clean travel” - « viage limpio ») (Garcia, 2010, interview) 
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1 million USD from 2012. FONAFIFO has indeed identified in the country 1, 1 million 320 
hectares of « Kyoto lands », which is to say lands deforested before 1990 that can be subject 321 
to reforestation or afforestation. In 2007, a sale of 0, 61 million of tons equivalent CO2 to the 322 
World Bank‟s Biocarbon Fund has already been carried on (Pagiola, 2008). The funding of 323 
the PESP for biodiversity conservation purpose becomes an important issue to complete the 324 
fundings obtained owing to carbon storage and water services which remain limited (Only the 325 
PESP-Reforestation on « Kyoto lands » can today find investments in the regulated 326 
international market, and the water tariff has to be used in the watershed where it has been 327 
generated) (Pagiola 2008). In this view, FONAFIFO has created, in the framework of the 328 
Ecomarkets project, a trust fund, the « Fund for Sustainable Biodiversity
38
 » that has received 329 
an initial grant from the GEF of 8 millions USD in the framework of the MMBIEM project 330 
and is expected to receive others grants and incomes from the sale of conservation certificates 331 
on the voluntary market
39
 (Pagiola, 2008). It is still too early to assess the success of these 332 
funds to ensure a sufficient and sustainable funding for biodiversity conservation.  333 
 334 
Beyond the established contractual obligations, PESP effects on the long run can also be 335 
assessed looking at its capacity to make social norms and values regarding forest conservation 336 
evolve. This aspect has been little studied until now and there is no consensus about it. 337 
Hartshorn and al. (2005) say that « PSA contracts may contribute to environmental protection 338 
indirectly by making the social norms and preferences of the participants more conservation-339 
oriented », thanks in particular to the institutionalization of the recognition of environmental 340 
services value. This perception change  of forest ecosystems has been noticed by several 341 
studies. Locatelli and al. (2007) have studied the perception of the participants to the PESP-342 
Reforestation in northern Costa Rica through a multicriteria analysis. They noticed that this 343 
program has improved the participants‟ consciousness of the importance of the ES provided 344 
by forest and has incited them to conserve the forest. 57% of their program participants 345 
sampled have thus declared that they would continue to reforest even without receiving PES 346 
and 65% said they had implemented measures to conserve biodiversity, ecosystems and water 347 
after having integrated the program.  According to Ortiz and al. (2003), 95% of the beneficiaries 348 
PESP-Protection interviewed think that the program has taught the people to value the forest and 93% 349 
think that thanks to PESP, landowners are more concerned than before the program about the 350 
                                                          
38
 “Fondo para la Biodiversidad Sostenible” 
39
 The  MMBIEM projet foresee a funging of  8,1 millions USD form the Governement of Costa Rica and of 0,4 
million for the sale of carbon credit (World Bank 2006)  
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maintenance of forest, water, fauna and flora
40. Hartshorn and al. (2005) noticed that the PESP 351 
does not explicitly provide conservation education materials to participants. Miranda and al. 352 
(2003) and Locatelli and al. (2007) mention however that forest organizations that serve as 353 
intermediaries in the framework of the PESP have played a key role in spreading 354 
environmental information and education.  Nevertheless, none of these studies have used a 355 
test group constituted of non-participants to the PESP in order to isolate the effects of the 356 
PESP from the others possible causes, which makes it impossible to conclude on this issue. 357 
On the contrary, Furst (2009, interview) thinks that a contractual and utilitarist logic that 358 
remunerates land owners at the level of their opportunity costs does not represent a robust 359 
solution for long term conservation: « When it will no longer be convenient for him, he [ndlr : 360 
the program participant] will break this agreement to go on deforesting. […] That is not 361 
based on a system of environmental protection with a social ground and I think that this is 362 
necessary to have conservation on the long run. The logic is too mercantilistic
41
 ».   363 
 364 
2. The costs of the Costa Rican PESP  365 
 366 
In order to assess the performance of the program from the point of view of its costs, we first 367 
study the level of the transaction costs, then the level of the payments (which are supposed to 368 
correspond to the estimate of the opportunity cost associated to the restrictions of use), before 369 
comparing the cost of the PESP to those of the implementation of protected areas delivering 370 
the same environmental outcomes.  371 
 372 
1. The  transaction costs 373 
 374 
A distinguishion among the transaction costs is being made, the costs of access to the program 375 
borne by the participants (the laying out of the application folder including the design of a 376 
management plan, monitoring of the contract compliance) and the administrative costs of 377 
FONAFIFO functioning.  In this study the costs associated to the design of the program are 378 
not considered, due to the lack of information available    .  379 
 380 
                                                          
40
 The focus groups led by Ortiz and al. (2003) give more mixed results; the answers of the PESP participants 
vary depending on the regions, some thinling that the PESP has reinforced environmental consciuousness  while 
others don‟t think this is the case.  
41
 "Cuando a él, ya no le conviene más, va a quebrar este acuerdo y seguir con la desforestación. […] No está 
asentado en una protección del ambiente que tiene un fundamento social y yo creo que es necesario para tener 
una conservación a largo plazo. La lógica es demasiada mercantilista.” 
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The estimates of  access costs to the PESP bear by the participants vary from 12 to 18% of the 381 
payments total amount according to Miranda and al. (2003) or from 22% to 25% including 382 
others taxes according to Baltodano (2000) quoted by Locatelli and al. (2007).  383 
FONAFIFO functioning costs have been initially limited by the law in 1996 to 5 % of the 384 
PESP budget, and then this limit has been raised to 7% in 2003. The program appeared then 385 
particularly competitive in controlling its costs : according to Ferraro and Kiss (2002), in the 386 
USA, administrative costs often represent 25% of the budgets of the conservation contracts 387 
while in the case of Water Conservation Fund in Quito, these costs are estimated between 10 388 
to 20 % of the payments channelled through the fund (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002). 389 
However, the institutional transformation of FONAFIFO into a classic public institution made 390 
its costs boom since 2008 to reach 22% of the budget in 2008 (Mendez 2009, interview; Vega 391 
2009, interview).  392 
 393 
The analysis of the Costa Rican PESP shows that transaction costs represent some 40% of the 394 
total amount of the channelled payments, without considering the costs of the program design. 395 
This amount is higher than the level of transaction costs usually observed in developed 396 
countries and stands in the highest part of the bracket of the carbon sequestration program‟s 397 
transaction costs in developing countries
42
 (Wunder 2007).  The PESP costs thus appear, 398 
since their substantial increase in 2008, relatively high. 399 
  400 
2. The level of payments 401 
 402 
Some 175 millions of USD have been channelled through the PESP between 1997 and 2008. 403 
In 1997, the prices proposed for the modalities of protection, of forest management and of  404 
 reforestation  were respectively 227 USD
43
, 365 USD and 545 USD per hectare for the whole 405 
duration of the contracts which are 5, 5 and 8 years. If this amount was supposed to 406 
correspond to the minimum by the populations (comparing to alternative uses such as 407 
intensive livestock in particular), the importance of the demand, which is almost three times 408 
higher than the possibilities of funding (Rojas and Aylward, 2003), show that is in fact very 409 
attractive. Furthermore, these amounts have raised due to political pressures from the PESP 410 
                                                          
42
 According to Wunder (2007), the transaction costs of the Canadian program of land diversion represent some 
25% of the total costs while those of the conservation reserve program in the USA are probably lower (quoting 
OECD 1997). The transaction costs of the carbon sequestration programs in developing countries vary between 6 
and 45 % of the paiements (quoting Cacho and al. 2005). 
43
 The exchange rate used is from the 31/12/2006. 
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beneficiaries. The prices of the protection and reforestation contracts reached respectively 320 411 
USD/ha and 816 USD/ha in 2005. In 2009, they came to a maximum of 400 USD/ha for some 412 
protection contracts and to 980 USD/ha for the reforestation contracts
44
. As these increases of 413 
prices were not necessary to find a sufficient number of people wishing to participate to the 414 
program, the program already facing a too high demand, we can conclude that they result in a 415 
decrease of the program efficiency. These price increases seem to be part of a search for a 416 
better social impact, which would indicate that the search for efficiency is not the only driving 417 
force of the PESP evolution. The idea in  part 3 is to search if the PESP efficiency can be 418 
substantially improved through the differentiation of payments amounts according to the 419 
opportunity costs of the beneficiaries but that this presents some risks.   420 
 421 
3. The comparison with another conservation scheme, the protected areas 422 
 423 
According to Sage (2000), the protection cost over 30 years of the forest resources through 424 
the PESP is largely lower (from 1,4 to 3,2 times less expensive depending on the hypothesis 425 
set)  than the traditional system of land buying by the state and protection through a national 426 
park. This result is confirmed whatever the discount rate set (between 6% and 16%) and 427 
including while overestimating the PESP costs of 20%. This study does not compare the costs 428 
and not the benefits generated by each scheme, those being considered arbitrarily as equal. 429 
The author notices that the buying of lands for the setting up of protected areas is becoming 430 
more and more difficult, because of the lack of funds of the Costa Rican state to pay the land 431 
owners - 44% of the lands declared as protected areas had not yet been paid to their owners in 432 
2000 (quoting the newspaper « La Nación » of February 2000, p. 4A)  –  but also because 433 
there is more legal possibilities of appeal that the land owners can mobilize in case of 434 
disagreements regarding the value of the lands.   435 
 436 
Hartshorn and al. (2005) estimate also the conservation cost per hectare on a period of 15 437 
years through the PESP in its modality of protection is 3 to 4 times lower than the cost of 438 
others instruments, such as public lands purchase for protected areas. 439 
                                                          
44
 In 2009, prices for the forest protection modality range from a minimum of 320 USD/ha in particular for the 
lands located within the protected areas to 375 USD/ha for the lands located within the « conservation blanks» 
(« vacios de conservación »: areas of importance for conservation but not yet covered by the existing network of 
protected areas) to reach a maximum of 400 USD/ha for the lands located in areas of hydrological importance. 
The prices for the reforestation modality raised from 816 USD/ha in 2005 to 980 USD/ha in 2009 while the 
prices for the modality of natural regeneration range in 2009 from 205 USD/ha to 320 USD/ha depending on 
whether or not these lands allow the commodification of the carbon sequestered.  
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 440 
However, for some actors, the amounts disbursed since the creation of the PESP have not 441 
generated any guarantee of forest conservation for the future, thus differing from the system 442 
of land acquisition by the state. They estimate that a balance should be looked for between the 443 
amounts allocated to the PESP and those allocated to the payments of the owed amounts by 444 
the state to the ex-owners of the lands located within the protected areas (Matamoros and Piva 445 
2009, interview ; Araya 2009, interview). According to Araya, the ex-executive director of 446 
FONAFIFO, the state would owe some 150 millions of USD for the acquisition of 86 000 447 
hectares of lands within national parks and biological reserves.  448 
 449 
3. What potential for improving the PESP efficiency? 450 
 451 
1.  A potential for improvement on the short run… 452 
 453 
The improvement of the PES efficiency can be reached through two levers: the improvement 454 
of its effectiveness and the decrease of its costs.  455 
 456 
First, it seems that FONAFIFO functioning costs could be reduced as they have recently 457 
boomed because of its change of the legal status from a private to public management which 458 
forced FONAFIFO to increase its numbers of employees and global wage costs and this 459 
without resulting in an improvement of the program effectiveness
45
.  460 
 461 
Moreover, according to Pagiola (2008), the lack of targeting and the undifferentiated level of 462 
payments, which are early characteristics of the program inherited from the former forest 463 
incentives programs, are  sub-optimal: they don‟t allow in fact to generate the maximum of 464 
ES (through the targeting) at the best cost (through payments adjusted to the opportunity costs 465 
of beneficiaries). However, improvements have been implemented regarding theses issues 466 
with the definition since 1999 of targeting criteria and the differentiation of payments since 467 
2009 within the protection and natural regeneration modalities. The same is true for the 468 
monitoring of ES generation that was included recently in some pilot contracts in the 469 
framework of the MMBIEM. 470 
 471 
                                                          
45
 This would imply presumably to come back to the previous system where FONAFIFO was managed 
according to the private labor law, which is unlikely.  
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Wunscher and al. (2008), using the example of the Nicoya peninsula, estimate that with 472 
constant costs,  the ES production could be doubled, through a better targeting of the lands 473 
integrated to the program and a flexibilization of the payments to adjust them at the costs 474 
borne by the participants because of conservation. They estimate that the biggest part of the 475 
potential for efficiency improvement (+93% on a global improvement potential of +105%) 476 
come from the payments flexibilization to adjust them to the big variations in terms of costs 477 
borne by the beneficiaries because of their participation: opportunity costs, transaction costs 478 
and the direct costs of implementing the measures required in the framework of the PESP-479 
Protection. The use of an ES production index to target the lands to be integrated in the 480 
program leads to a moderate improvement of the PESP efficiency. Finally the targeting of the 481 
lands using the deforestation probabilities turns out to be not very attractive because of the 482 
low variations of the deforestation risk within the region
46
 (Wunscher and al. 2008).  483 
 484 
The concrete implementation of this tool allowing the targeting of the lands (according to 485 
their deforestation risk and the capacity to generate ES) and the differentiation of the 486 
payments is facing several challenges: scientific ones (to access a very precise information 487 
regarding the participation costs of potential beneficiaries, the deforestation risk and the 488 
capacity to generate ES of the proposed lands), administrative ones (simultaneous decisions 489 
on all applications) but above all political ones (the most important challenge to the 490 
implementation of this tool would be political as it could seem unfair
47
) (Engel and al. 491 
2009
48
). The increase of the transaction costs inferred by the implementation of this new tool 492 
seems negligible
49
 according to Engel and al. (2009) as they are estimated at 0, 27% of the 493 
overall budget of the program each year.  494 
 495 
 496 
 497 
                                                          
46
 The low variations found in the study area between lands in terms of ES generated on the one hand and of 
deforestation risks on the other hand may be higher at the national level. Thus, using these two criteria to target 
PESP participants is probably more promising at the national level to improve the efficiency of the program than 
what found Wunscher and al. (2008) at the Nicoya peninsula level.  
47
 Engel and al. (2009) think in particular that payments differentiation could be perceived as an arbitrary 
discrimination and unerline the role of transparency of the selection process to avoid this. They also notice that 
paying the land owners the minimum amount to secure their participation to the program and maximize the ES 
buyers‟ benefits can be perceived as « unethical » if these landowners are poor and the buyers are wealthier, 
which does not seem to be the case of the PESP. Finally, they remind that the PESP can be considered as a 
compesation for a stricter environmental legislation (deforestation prohibition) rather than for achieving 
additional environmental benefits.   
48
 Engel and  al. (2009) present the same case as Wunscher and al. (2008). They are in fact the same authors.  
49
 They recognize however that FONAFIFO may not share their vision. 
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2. … which may reveal itself counterproductive on the long run 498 
 499 
If the targeting and the payments differentiation can be considered as options for improving 500 
the PESP on the short term, it is necessary to take into account the impacts of these options on 501 
the social norms and values plus the legitimacy of the program to estimate the improvement 502 
potential of efficiency on the long term.  503 
 504 
Indeed,is possible to speculate about the impact on social norms and values of the efficiency 505 
gains resulting from a decrease of prices as it is the case because of the flexibilization of 506 
payments in the most efficient approaches identified by Wunscher and al. (2008).  The 507 
environmental effectiveness of an extremely low valuation of ES seems questionable from the 508 
point of view of the long term objective of a better valuation of immaterial benefits provided 509 
by forests within the Costa Rican society, which has been the founding principle of the PESP 510 
creation and one of its main justifications (Gonzales, interview 2009). According to Kosoy 511 
and al. (2007) or Muradian and al. (2009), the level of the payments received does not allow 512 
in some PES schemes
50
 to compensate integrally the opportunity costs of numerous 513 
beneficiaries, who nevertheless participate to the programs as they would have conserved the 514 
forest anyway due to social and cultural norms and values. The role of the payment is not to 515 
change behaviours, the payments being too low to incite the actors prone to deforest not to do 516 
it, but rather to reinforce « good environmental stewardship ». (Kosoy and al. 2007 ; Corbera 517 
and al. 2009). This is often the case of the Costa Rican PESP (Miranda and al, 2003 ; Ortiz 518 
and al., 2003), which indicates that if the payments were too low they could result 519 
counterproductive. As a matter of fact, extrinsic rewards can impact negatively on intrinsic 520 
motivation (Deci, Koestner, and Ryan 1999 quoted by Wunder 2005), such as the 521 
community‟s own interest or the pride derived from forest conservation. This risk seems 522 
particularly high in the case of payments of small amounts (Heyman and Ariely 2004 quoted 523 
by Wunder 2005) where the efforts in terms of conservation could result lower than in the 524 
case in which there would be no payment at all.  525 
 526 
The same is true for the reconsideration of the egalitarian principle, by which the levels of 527 
payments are the same whatever the ES value or their generation cost are, that can allow to 528 
                                                          
50
 Kosoy and al. (2007) refer to the three cases in Central America they have studied: Jesus de Otoro (Honduras), 
San Pedro del Norte (Nicaragua) and Heredia (Costa Rica) while Corbera and al. (2009) refer to the Mexican 
national program of PES.  
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maximize the efficiency of the PESP on the short term but can jeopardize on the longer term 529 
as this principle is the pillar of the PESP legitimacy according to Pascual and al. (2009)
51
. 530 
Pascual and al. (2009) underline indeed the potential conflicts between the objective of 531 
egalitarian distribution of funds through payments of identical levels and the environmental 532 
objective of PES programs.  533 
 534 
Finally, the search for additionality from the point of view of the fight against deforestation 535 
can create perverse incentives: channelling payments only towards the land owners that may 536 
degrade the environment can incite the people to degrade the environment if they are not paid 537 
for the ES they provide (Wunder, 2005). Some examples at the international level in the 538 
negotiations on REDD and the case of the PES RISEMP
52
 project (Pagiola and al. 2004) 539 
underline this danger. This project initially foresees the payment for the incremental ES 540 
production, without taking into account the services provided by the existing trees.  But the 541 
participants were threatening to cut down the existing trees to be able to benefit of the 542 
payments for the reforestation of a larger area. Furthermore, this approach presented the risk 543 
to discourage the non-participants to the program from the neighbouring areas to implement 544 
by themselves improved silvopastoral practices for fear of not being able in the future to 545 
benefit from the program.  The program has thus decided to implement payments for pre-546 
existing ES. The search for additionnality can also weaken the legitimacy of the scheme if all 547 
the environmental services providers are not rewarded but only those that may no provide 548 
these services in case there was no payment (Wunder, 2007). 549 
 550 
Conclusion 551 
 552 
The PESP has had therefore a low direct impact on the forest cover of the country. However, 553 
it is necessary to replace the PESP in the framework of a change in the forest policy of the 554 
country, especially the prohibition of forested land uses change, for which it has been 555 
considered as a compensation, to assess its positive indirect impact on forest cover. The ES 556 
generation by lands under contract seems globally satisfactory due to the improvement of the 557 
targeting of the lands integrated to the program. Nevertheless, this improvement is facing an 558 
inherent limit as the program pays for each contracted land four ES while trade-offs between 559 
                                                          
51
 Pascual and al. (2009) consider it the « fairness criteria » of the program. 
52
 The Regional Integrated Silvopastoral Ecosystem Management Project funded by Global Environmental Fund 
aims to promote improved silvopastoral practices in degraded pastures areas through PES mechanisms. It has 
been implemented from 2002 to 2007.  
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these ES are unavoidable : the areas rich in biodiversity do not necessary correspond to the 560 
areas of hydrological importance for example. The PESP appeared also quite competitive 561 
regarding the level of transaction costs and functioning costs until 2008, before FONAFIFO 562 
functioning costs boomed due to its institutional transformation.   563 
 564 
A significant potential for improvement of the PESP efficiency exists on the short term through the 565 
differentiation of the payments levels or through the targeting of the areas most prone to be 566 
deforested. Nevertheless, these recommendations do not take into account the institutional 567 
nature of PESP and the meanings that the stakeholders have given to this program and that 568 
ensure its legitimacy. In fact, this evolution would oppose some of its founding principles 569 
(non search of additionnality but rather compensation for ES provision, egalitarian principle 570 
for the definition of the level of payments), around which the different actors have built its 571 
legitimacy that secures its viability. Thus, according to Wunder (2005), « a PES scheme needs 572 
to strike some balance between short-term efficiency and fairness, the latter influencing long-573 
run conservation viability ». Moreover, these recommendations, by giving priority to a purely 574 
utilitarian logic, may weaken on the long run the social norms and values impacting forest 575 
conservation and could eventually reveal themselves counterproductive (Martinez-Allier 576 
2002, Clements and al. 2009, Kosoy and Corbera 2009, Vatn 2009). Indeed, according to 577 
Vatn (2009) « by changing which perspectives and value apply, institutions have the capacity 578 
to change the logic of the situation. They act as rationality context […] It may change the 579 
logic from one where it is about what is better for the community to do to what is the better 580 
for oneself. »  Thus the search for the improvement of the PESP efficiency must take into 581 
account its potential effects on the long term and consider on the one hand the nature of this 582 
institutional arrangement in order not to undermine its legitimacy and on the other hand its 583 
potential impact on social values and norms dealing with conservation. 584 
 585 
 586 
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